1. On 11 February 2011, millions of Yemenis took to the streets protesting the thirty-three (33) year reign of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s (Saleh) presidency. With approximately 63% of the Yemeni population under the age of 24 years old, the revolution from the outset was heavily influenced by the Youth movement alongside the opposition alliance. These groups broadly outlined the goals that were announced in February 2011 only to have their demands changed as the revolution bore on.
2. On 14 February 2011, a statement was issued by the main opposition alliance which consisted of six demands: 1) the construction of a non-centralized state for all Yemeni citizens in which justice and equality would reign supreme; 2) admitting that there was an issue in the South and reaching a just resolution to the conflict; 3) bringing a complete stop to the wars in the Saada region; 4) providing for an equitable distribution of resources and the resolution of Yemen’s economic problems in order to achieve fairness and equality in distributing public sector jobs; 5) to put an end to corruption, and to create meritocratic national institutions on national grounds, and not on alliances or cronyism; and 6) making the war against terror a national issue by removing it from the circles of opportunism and marshalling all possible national resources to not only combat terrorism but eliminate it.
3. On 2 April 2011, the opposition parties taking part in the Joint Meeting caucus announced a shared vision for the period of power transfer which entailed the following terms: 1) The president to announce his resignation, and his powers and privileges to be transferred to his deputy; 2) The deputy, upon assuming power, to work towards restricting the roles of the national security and central security forces, and the presidential guard by defining their duties according to the constitution and the law, and finding able leaders with high nationalist and professional standards who have attained their posts through merit rather than tribal considerations or cronyism; 3) That an agreement would be reached with the interim leader , the former deputy, Abdurabbuh Mansur Hadi(Hadi) over distribution of power during the transition period, based on the foundations of national unity, in which the following would happen: a) the formation of a transitional national council that represents all the elements of political and social life that would function to propose solutions for all major issues affecting Yemen, including the Southern issue, and formulate a vision for constitutional reform that would guarantee political and cultural freedoms, and the construction of a modern civil state which would be a civic state with a decentralized system; b) the creation of an interim national unity government chaired by the opposition in which all political actors are represented, including businessmen and youthful protesters; c) the formation of an interim military council whose members would include military leadership figures known for their competence and honesty, and who would be respected and appreciated by the rank-and-file military; d) the formation of a Higher Council for Elections and Referendums that would undertake a referendum on constitutional reforms and parliamentary and presidential elections based on the new constitution’s guidelines; e) the public affirmation of peaceful expression, the right to peaceful protest, and other civil rights for all Yemeni citizens and the launching of an investigation into the hostile actions taken against protesters across Yemen, but especially the massacres in Aden, Sanaa, Taiz, and other situations in which live ammunition and tear gas were used; hauling into court those responsible for the crimes and compensating the victims’ families for their losses due to death or injury.
4. On or about November 24, 2011, Saleh signed off on the GCC Initiative which sought to install Hadi as President of Yemen during the transitional period, in exchange for Saleh and his family’s immunity from prosecution. Pursuant to the GCC Initiative, the parties and factions who signed off on the document agreed that Hadi would be tasked with overseeing and managing the post-revolutionary transition as the transitional president by consensus, consensus that did not have the agreement of influential political factions such as Ansarallah (commonly referred to as “Houthi”) and the Southern Hirak. Both political factions opted not to sign the GCC Initiative as Hadi was an integral accomplice to the crimes committed against Southerners in the 1994 civil war and because no other candidate was allowed to be nominated. The main objectives of the GCC Initiative and Hadi’s mission were to issue 1) a draft constitution and 2) hold general elections within a two year mandate.
5. On or about 21 February 2012, a single candidate election involving Hadi was held in Yemen. Thereafter, on 25 February 2012, Hadi was sworn in as transitional president of Yemen, officially removing Saleh from power. During his two year term, Hadi did not manage to issue a draft constitution nor did he succeed in holding general elections before expiry of his two year term.
6. On 21 January 2014, the same political parties and factions that signed off on the GCC Initiative extended Hadi’s term for another year in the last month before expiry of his two year term. On 17 January 2015, Hadi managed to issue a draft constitution towards the last month of his extended term but it was unpopular and he never managed to hold general elections. He resigned on January 22, 2015 and did not withdraw his resignation before expiry of his extended term despite calls by the political parties and factions for him to do so. He then left Sanaa for Aden where he claimed he was still the President despite having resigned and his mandate expiring as well. He attempted to move the government to Aden but then was chased out of Yemen army Yemeni army due to what they claimed was a dereliction of duty He became a fugitive on the run managing to escape to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia where he allegedly requested the Saudi Arabian government to conduct a war on Yemen in order to re-install him as President of Yemen.
7. On 26 March 2015, a Coalition led by Saudi Arabia consisting of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey (together “the Coalition”) launched a war on the people of Yemen without a UN mandate. From the outset, this Coalition was supported politically, diplomatically, and militarily by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.
8. On 26 April 2015, the former UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, stated that: “When this campaign started, one thing that was significant but went unnoticed is that the Yemenis were close to a deal that would institute power-sharing with all sides, including the Houthis,”
9. After about 2 months of war without achieving its stated official objectives and after failing to convince Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey to provide ground troops, the Coalition sought out other ways to bolster its troops on the ground in preparation for a ground invasion. To achieve that end, the Coalition relied on paying foreign troops and mercenaries. After months of stalemate, the number of countries participating in the Coalition increased to include Sudan and Senegal, both sending large numbers of troops to Yemen. In addition to hiring Sudanese and Senegalese troops, the Coalition relied and continues to rely heavily on the use of mercenaries to violate the right of Yemenis to life and to impede their right to self-determination in violation of Article 1 and Article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.
Statement of Facts and Allegations
10. On 4 May 2015, Senegal’s Foreign Minister Mankeur Ndiaye confirmed that Senegal would be sending 2,100 troops to Saudi Arabia to fight alongside the Coalition against the people of Yemen and suppress their right to self-determination. According to a Washington Post article, Andrew Lebovich - a security and political analyst focused on West Africa - stated that the “most obvious potential benefit of a Senegalese military engagement alongside Saudi Arabia would be in the form of closer political and economic ties between the two, and almost certainly direct cash payments from Saudi Arabia to Senegal.”
11. The Coalition was able to find a paid partner in Sudan. According to some media reports, Sudan received USD 2.2 billion in financial grants from Saudi Arabia and Qatar and in return sent a reported 6000-10000 Sudanese troops to Yemen to fight alongside the Coalition. The participation of Sudan in the Coalition against Yemen was based on a decision made by Mr. Omar Albashir and his Minister of Defense, Mr. Abdulrahim Hussein, without justification warranting such aggression and without a supportive UN mandate.
12. The Coalition was also able to hire mercenaries from Reflex Responses, a private company connected to Erik Prince, the founder of the private company known as Blackwater. On 25 November 2015, The New York times reported that some of the mercenaries now in Yemen, “… handpicked from a brigade of some 1,800 Latin American soldiers training at an Emirati military base, were woken up in the middle of the night for their deployment to Yemen last month. They were ushered out of their barracks as their bunkmates continued sleeping, and were later issued dog tags and ranks in the Emirati military. Those left behind are now being trained to use grenade launchers and armored vehicles that Emirati troops are currently using in Yemen.”  According to the New York Times article, the mercenaries received salaries ranging from USD $2,000 - $3,000 per month while training in Zayed Military City, compared to their $400 monthly salary they would make in Colombia. In addition to the monthly salary, $1,000 per week was received by the mercenaries who agreed to fight in Yemen alongside the Coalition, according to a person involved in the project and a former senior Colombian military officer.
13. On 26 November 2015, the Colombian daily El Tiempo reported that around 100 Colombians had arrived in Yemen in early October, as part of a bigger contingent that was to follow. It is alleged that the soldiers are being lured to Yemen by a higher salary and better conditions than they endured during years of fighting at home against FARC.
14. On or about 1 December 2015, sources on the ground including military, security and anonymous sources, reported a contingent of hundreds of Sudanese troops and foreign mercenaries marching towards Taiz from their bases in Aden after arriving at the port city a month before. This contingent of mercenaries was supported by Coalition armored vehicles, heavy weaponry, and air cover provided by Apache helicopters.
15. On 7 December 2015, three Sudanese mercenaries were killed by the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees in the Lahj province.
16. On or about 8 December 2015, seven Blackwater mercenaries with different nationalities were killed by the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees near the Alomari Military Base in Taiz. Among these mercenaries were six Columbians and an Australian commander.
17. On or about 8 December 2015, another seven Blackwater mercenaries with different nationalities were killed by the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees in Thubab, Taiz. Leading the group of mercenaries was a retired British Colonel provisionally named Arthur Kingston. Among these mercenaries were a Frenchman, a Mexican commander by the name of Macias Bacneba, and several Columbians.
18. On or about 10 December 2015, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees killed tens of Blackwater mercenaries in the Hadeed area in Kirsch, Lahj. Among those mercenaries was an Argentinean by the name of Ferdinand Lamos who died while on board a US Navy vessel from serious injuries sustained during the battle in Lahj. Lamos was reportedly a former member of the “Foreign Legions,” a military contracting company with ties to the Blackwater group. Another mercenary by the name of Ezel Goldstein was among the dead.
19. On or about 13 December 2015, 16 Sudanese mercenaries were killed in the Lahj Province.
20. On or about 14 December 2015, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees killed tens of Blackwater mercenaries in the Bab Almandeb area in Shaab Aljinn, Taiz with a Tochka missile that targeted the gathering ofCoalition troops, mercenaries, and members of known terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (also known as AQAP). Among the 42 Blackwater mercenaries killed were the following:
a. George Edgar Mahoney, American, who according to a Yemeni security source was implicated in the Blackwater crimes committed in Iraq;
b. Carlos Nicholas, commander of the Columbian mercenary brigade; and
c. Moshe Kabirov, Israeli of Russian origin.
21. On or about 17 December 2015, an additional four Blackwater mercenaries with different nationalities were killed by the Yemeni Army and Popular committees. The identity of these mercenaries are as follows:
a. Abetti Carboni, Italian
b. Jaweed Altaf Khan, American of Pakistani origin
c. Wasmoo’eel Baribootatana, Rwandan
d. Mazoolu Kinyati, South African
22. On or about 22 December 2015, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees targeted a gathering of invading troops in Thubab, Taiz with rocket and artillery fire. Among the dead was a Blackwater mercenary named Alexandro Torinas whose nationality is unidentified.
23. On or about 24 December 2015, unidentified assailants targeted a Blackwater convoy with mortars in Aden. The attack resulted in the injury of senior Blackwater mercenary, Nicholas Buttros, an American of Lebanese origin.
24. On or about 31 January 2015, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees targeted a gathering of invading troops in Alanad Air Base with a Tochka missile that killed tens of foreign troops and mercenaries including the new leader of the Blackwater mercenaries in Yemen, Nicholas Buttros.
25. On 7 February 2015, the Yemeni Army and Popular Committees killed seven Blackwater mercenaries and seriously injured 39 while three have gone missing, an Australian, Columbian and Venezuelan. Among the dead were the following:
a. Alfonso Bernario, Columbian
b. Alfareez Bensiros, Chilean
c. Pablo Jarko Vitalis, Columbian
d. Jack Richardson, Australian
e. Casias Banwater, Venezuelan
f. Carrera de Nora, Columbian
g. Vasilev Si Serg, Ukranian
26. On 9 February 2015, the chairman of the Commission of the Knights of Malta (Blackwater) decided to withdraw the so-called “strike force” from the front lines in around Al-Omari military base as a result of the casualties sustained in their ranks in the past two months. And are alleged to have withdrawn completely from Yemen.
27. Reports have surfaced that the Saudi-led Coalition contracted the services of DynCorp in order to send thousands of mercenaries to Yemen. Investigation is ongoing.
28. The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries affirms that the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries should be considered as offenses of grave concern to all states and that any person committing any of these offenses should be either prosecuted or extradited. The mercenaries used were specially recruited abroad from countries like Columbia after their selection was made by officials from the United Arab Emirates. According to the New York Times article cited above, most of the recruiting of former troops in Colombia is done by Global Enterprises, a Colombian company run by a former special operations commander named Oscar Garcia Batte who is also alleged to be co-commander of the brigade of Colombian troops in the Emirates, and is part of the force now deployed in Yemen. Furthermore, the mercenaries that were killed by the Yemeni army and Popular Committees were of various nationalities as shown in the statement of facts. The mercenaries were motivated by private gain as demonstrated by their salaries which are alleged to be upwards of USD 6000 a month. This motivation has caused what is called a “gun drain” in Columbia as mercenaries flock to Yemen in search of better wages and benefits. The individuals used as mercenaries are not nationals or members of the armies of any of the state parties to the Coalition nor are they residents of the state of Yemen, where the attacks are directed.
29. Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognizes the right to self-determination and accordingly recognizes the right of all peoples to freely determine their political status. Additionally, Article 6 recognizes the inherent right to life and provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. The recruitment of Blackwater mercenaries by the Coalition has impeded the right of the people to self-determination and has played a role in the suppression of Yemen’s peaceful transition to a new government inclusive of all parties and factions in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
 All statements of allegations referring to the identities of the mercenaries have been verified by sources on the ground including military, security, and anonymous sources. Media reports are only cited to show that the allegations have been reported by widespread media sources in various countries across the World.
 Mohammed Aboud, Egypt allegedly sends ground forces into Yemen quagmire, The Middle East Eye, 9 August 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egyptians-allegedly-sends-ground-forces-yemen-quagmire-132459953#sthash.qu9yz0EN.dpuf
 Mohammad Mukashaf, Pakistan declines Saudi call for armed support in Yemen fight, Reuters, 10 April 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0N10LO20150410
 Blog, Turkish and Saudi leaders discuss Yemen conflict, The Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/live-blog-saudi-and-arab-allies-bomb-houthi-positions-yemen-1521000548
 Ishaan Tharoor, Why Senegal is sending troops to help Saudi Arabia in Yemen, The Washington Post, 5 May 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/05/why-senegal-is-sending-troops-to-help-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/
 Replaced by Awad al-Karim Ibnouf as Defense Minister on 23 August 2015, and therefore responsible for the heavy involvement of Sudanese troops in Saudi-led Coalition operations.
 Blackwater, Xe Services, Academi, Reflex Responses are all private companies that have links to each other providing mercenary services (hereinafter referred to as Blackwater).
 Emily B. Hager and Mark Mazzetti, Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight, The New York Times, 25 November 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html?_r=0
 Jineth Bedoya Lima, Los colombianos que pelearán otra guerra en el Golfo, El Tiempo, 26 November 2015. http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/medio-oriente/soldados-colombianos-que-irana-yemen/16406208
 Michael Safi, Joshua Robertson, Australian mercenary reportedly killed in Yemen clashes, The Guardian, 8 December 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/dec/09/australian-mercenary-reportedly-killed-yemen-clashes
 Dogs of War: British mercenary reported killed in Yemen, Russia Today, 11 December 2015. https://www.rt.com/uk/325594-british-mercenary-killed-yemen/
 Mueren un comandante mexicano y un combatiente argentino de Blackwater en Yemen, HispanTV, 9 December 2015. http://www.hispantv.com/newsdetail/Yemen/78429/yemen-ansarola-comandante-blackwater-taiz
 Johnlee Varghese, Yemen: Argentinian mercenary soldier dies fighting Houthis, International Business Times, 11 December 2015. http://www.ibtimes.co.in/yemen-argentinian-mercenary-soldier-dies-fighting-houthis-659081
 Death of Ezel Goldstein, a Blackwater mercenary, in Lahj, Almasirah, 11 December 2015. http://almasirah.net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%82-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85-17-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88/
 Death of a New Mercenary From Blackwater USA, Almasirah, 22 December 2015. http://almasirah.net/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1/
 Injury of a Senior Blackwater Commander in an Attack in Aden, Almasira, 24 December 2015. http://almasirah.net/%D8%A5%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A8/
 The Initial Tochka Count: Tens killed including a Blackwater commander, Almasirah, 31 January 2016. http://almasirah.net/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%83%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84/
 Blackwater retreats with its mercenaries from Alomari, Almasirah, 9 February 2016. http://almasirah.net/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%88%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A/
 Text of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries as adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 44/34 of 4 December 1989 and as entered into force: 20 October 2001, in accordance with article 19. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Mercenaries.aspx