The Saudi-led Coalition Airstrikes and Blockade on Yemen’s Food Sector along with the Hadi Government-in-exile Decision to Withhold Public Sector Employee Salaries and Ensure the Central Bank of Yemen Refrains From Underwriting Transactions for Food Imports Has Impoverished Millions in Yemen Bringing an Entire Nation to the Brink of Famine
1. On 26 March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia consisting of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, (together “the Coalition”) launched a military intervention to “defend the legitimate government of President Hadi from the takeover attempts by the Houthi militias in Yemen.” From the outset, the Coalition was supported politically, diplomatically, and militarily by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey.
2. After about two months of war without achieving its stated official objectives and after failing to convince Egypt[1], Pakistan[2] and Turkey[3] to provide ground troops, the Coalition sought out other ways to bolster its troops on the ground in preparation for a ground invasion. To achieve that end, the Coalition hired foreign troops and mercenaries. After months of stalemate, the number of countries participating in the Coalition increased to include Sudan[4] and Senegal[5], both sending large numbers of troops to Yemen. In addition to hiring Sudanese and Senegalese troops, the Coalition relied and continues to rely on the use of mercenaries to continue hostilities.
3. In the first 700 days of war, the Coalition conducted daily airstrikes that killed and injured 50000 civilians and leveled civilian infrastructure, particularly targeting the food sector along with its distribution networks. According to the Legal Center for Rights and Development, 15 airports and 14 seaports have been targeted with airstrikes, alongside 281 water tanks and networks,[6] 160 power stations (affecting refrigeration and water pumping facilities), 535 markets, 271 factories, 1565 agricultural fields, 207 poultry farms,[7] 660 food warehouses and 502 trucks carrying food[8] among other civilian objects including 1520 roads and bridges.[9] [10]
4. The Coalition has also used internationally banned cluster munitions to target homes, agricultural fields and roads on at least 60 occasions.[11]
5. In addition to daily airstrikes, the Saudi Coalition imposed a comprehensive land, air and sea blockade on Yemen, under the cover of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216, which involve an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five named individuals.[12] The Saudi Coalition stopped ships at will, and over the course of the first 700 days of war delayed their entry for days, weeks or months at a time under the pretext of ongoing weapons searches, granting them entry at times only after a coerced bribe. Ships were also denied entry entirely.[13]
6. In May 2016, former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced the U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM).[14] The UNVIM is designed to facilitate the unimpeded flow of commercial goods and services to 3 Yemeni ports - Saleef, Mokha, Hodeidah and associated oil terminals - while ensuring compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the U.N. Security Council. In effect, the UNVIM addresses the Coalition’s blockade by establishing a U.N. mechanism for searching and inspecting incoming ships for weapons, making the process more efficient and thereby helping to alleviate the mass suffering caused by the blockade. However, ships carrying commercial goods and humanitarian aid continued to be blocked from entry into Yemen’s ports. For example in the month of March 2017 alone, 16 ships with containers of mixed food items were diverted to Saudi ports, such as Jizan, despite being cleared by the UNVIM.[15]
7. In his update to the U.N. Security Council on 31 October 2016, the Undersecretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’brien stated that offloading cargo can take up to 30 days because of 1) inefficient port management, 2) financial disputes among shippers and above all 3) slow offloading due to limited capacity at Hodeida port which was severely damaged by airstrikes in August 2015.[16] As a consequence, fuel imports have averaged a fifth of the pre-airstrikes levels since February 2016.[17] In his update to the U.N. Security Council on 26 January 2017, O’brien stated that “delays in receiving clearances are also due to restrictions imposed by the Saudi-led Coalition such as the hampering of vessels’ access to Yemeni Red Sea ports and the absence of clear lists of prohibited items.”[18] Providing an example of the Coalition’s interference with incoming cargo ships, O’brien stated that “a vessel carrying four WFP-procured mobile cranes has arrived in the Red Sea, but has been ordered by Saudi authorities to leave Yemeni waters and is now anchored 15 miles off Yemen’s coast. The vessel is awaiting the Coalition’s approval to berth at the port. These cranes will boost the port’s capacity in handling humanitarian cargo. Two of the cranes will be used exclusively by the U.N. (WFP) and help expedite the timely delivery of vital humanitarian aid supplies.”[19] Unfortunately, even with U.N. involvement and mechanisms in place, the Coalition continues to have the final word on cargo attempting to enter Hodeida port, which is the lifeline of the population handling more than eighty percent (80%) of imports into Yemen before the war began.
8. The Saudi Coalition war has had a devastating impact on what was an already fragile economy in Yemen. According to the 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “[s]ince the escalation of conflict, government authorities estimate that GDP per capita has contracted by about 35 percent and that inflation has risen by 30 percent. The impact has squeezed the coping mechanisms of vulnerable families even further, leaving more people in need of humanitarian assistance.”[20] According to the World Bank, although official statistical reporting on Yemen is no longer available, “the data gathered suggests that Yemen’s GDP contracted since 2015 by about 40%, cumulatively.”[21]
9. Public sector revenue was particularly negatively impacted during the years 2015 and 2016. Crude oil and liquefied natural gas (gas) exports were suspended by the Hadi government-in-exile causing revenues from oil and gas exports to drop by 80% and 65%, respectively, in 2015. In 2016, there was no oil and gas revenue to be accounted for since the Hadi government-in-exile decided to resume exports and deposit the proceeds in a Saudi Commercial bank rather than a Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) account in violation of the CBY’s rules and regulations. The loss of revenue from oil and gas exports has, in turn, created considerable fiscal challenges as revenue from taxes has been proportionally slashed as well not to mention the loss of an essential source of foreign exchange which has jeopardized the entire Yemeni banking sector.[22]
10. From March 2015 to September 2016, government agencies across the country deposited their revenues into government accounts held in the CBY headquarters in Sanaa and the CBY branches located in their respective governorates. However, starting September 2016, the branches of the CBY in Aden, Mukalla, and Almahra stopped depositing the revenues collected in their jurisdiction in CBY government accounts. Instead, the Hadi government-in-exile established separate current accounts into which large sums of collected revenues were set aside and used in violation of Yemen’s laws and the CBY’s rules and regulations. Alongside this, Marib’s branch, did not record with the CBY network any oil and gas revenues gained from sales in the domestic market since late 2015.[23]
11. Notwithstanding the downward pressures in government revenue explained above, the CBY, under the leadership of Bin Humam, provided the necessary liquidity for the salaries of all public agencies and pension payments amounting to about YR 90 billion up to the end of August 2016. This included salaries of military personnel which were paid in cash from CBY branches to regional commands across governorates regardless of the recipient’s affiliation with either side of the armed conflict. Critical health, water, and education expenditures were also made in the period when CBY was under the governance of Bin Humam.[24]
12. As a remedial measure to the liquidity crisis, the CBY under the governance of Bin Humam negotiated terms with the Russian Goznak Company to print Yemen’s currency whereby the first batch was to arrive in Yemen as early as September 2016. However, the Hadi government-in-exile interfered with the agreement’s execution and managed to ensure that the Russian company did not sign off on the agreement.[25]
13. On September 18, 2016, exiled Transitional President Hadi sacked the Central Bank Governor, Mohammed Bin Humam and unilaterally announced the relocation of the Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden.[26]
Statement of Facts and Allegations
14. The CBY move directly interfered with the CBY’s implementation of Yemen’s fiscal and monetary policy and thereby its ability to fulfill its mandate causing millions of civilians to suffer as a result.
15. The CBY move to Aden under the control of the Hadi government-in-exile has resulted in the non-payment of monthly salaries to about 1.5 million public sector employees since September 2016, despite assurances by the Hadi government-in-exile to the international community that it would undertake all the obligations of the CBY. Given that each public sector employee has an average of five dependents, the lack of payment of their monthly salaries for over six months directly impoverishes about 7.5 million people. The reduced purchasing power due to the lack of salary payments has had an indirect negative effect on economic activity in general further impoverishing merchants and traders, their employees and families.
16. Despite receiving the first batch of YR 100 billion in currency from the Goznak Company print job, the Hadi government-in-exile has only managed to pay one monthly salary to about 40,000 public sector employees in the amount of YR 3 billion as of 7 March 2017. It is worthy to mention here that customs and tax revenues collected in southern and eastern governorates surpass their salary expenditures yet the surplus is not being transferred to branches in the North and West of Yemen where 85 percent of the population is located. In addition to newly printed bank notes in possession and control of the Hadi government-in-exile not being transferred to CBY branches under the control of de facto authorities, surplus tax revenue from the southern and eastern governorates is not being transferred to the Northern and Western governorates either.
17. Whereas, the CBY under Bin Humam was facilitating the underwriting of transactions on behalf of merchants importing basic commodities such as wheat, rice and oil, this is no longer happening effectively under the CBY governance of the Hadi government-in-exile.
18. According to Obrien’s update to the U.N. Security Council on 26 January 2017, “[t]he sharp decline in the Central Bank’s foreign reserves combined with its move to Aden and lack of liquidity has a ruinous socio-economic impact. Yemen could run out of wheat within months unless traders can access lines of credit in the coming weeks. Foreign banks no longer accept financial transactions with many of Yemen’s commercial banks. We must mobilize to sustain the traders’ ability to import, replenish the country’s stocks of staple food and reverse the trend of growing food insecurity and potential starvation. In addition, some humanitarian organizations are struggling to find enough cash to implement projects. The end result is a country in economic distress, which is translating into acute humanitarian need.”[27]
19. The drop in Yemen’s foreign exchange reserves due in large part to the blocking of oil and gas exports coupled with the blockade on food, medicine and fuel imports has resulted in the skyrocketing of commodity prices by more than double pre-war price levels widening the poverty base in the country. As stated in the 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “[c]onflict, severe economic decline and imposed restrictions are all contributing to basic commodity shortages and price rises, making it difficult for millions of Yemenis to afford food, water, fuel and other necessities even when these are available in markets.”[28]
20. While the lack of payment to public sector employees from over six months impoverished millions of civilians, the lack of payment of scholarships for students studying abroad has caused hundreds to stop their pursuit of higher education because they could not cover tuition nor their accommodation expenses including rent and general living expenses.[29]
21. The following is a chart[30] showing an approximate 50% decrease in food and fuel imports in 2015 as an effect of unlawful attacks on port infrastructure and associated terminals and a comprehensive land, air and sea blockade.
22. According to the 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “[t]he World Bank estimates that the poverty rate in Yemen has doubled to 62 per cent, and millions of people are now unable to meet their basic needs independently. Deliberate polices and tactics are driving this decline. On numerous occasions, parties to the conflict have targeted key economic infrastructure such as ports, roads, bridges, factories and markets with air strikes, shelling or other attacks. They have also imposed severe access restrictions that severely disrupt the flow of private sector goods essential to civilians’ survival, including food, fuel and medicine. Millions of people are now unable to meet their needs independently as a result of the economic decline – itself the result of deliberate policies. Imposed restrictions on imports, movements and financial transactions are crippling the commercial sector and hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid. The end result is an economic environment in which basic commodities are becoming scarcer and more expensive, putting them increasingly out of people’s reach.”[31] The 2017 Humanitarian Overview goes on to state that “[r]eported restrictions on imports by the Coalition, as well as air strikes on critical infrastructure like Al Hudaydah [Hodeida] Port, have added to the humanitarian burden by severely reducing commercial imports into the country. Fluctuating Coalition restrictions on imports, as well as air strikes on critical infrastructure like Al Hudaydah [Hodeida] Port, have added to the humanitarian burden by severely reducing commercial imports into the country. More than 90 per cent of staple food in Yemen was imported before the crisis, and the country was using an estimated 544,000 metric tons of fuel per month.”[32]
23. Oxfam reports that “a halt on wheat imports can further plunge the Yemeni population to a worryingly catastrophic hunger that will inevitably lead to a widespread starvation. A punishing naval and air blockade and the destruction of port facilities continue to hamper the flow of vital supplies such as food, fuel and medicine.” [33] Yemen imported 90% of its food requirement prior to the Saudi Coalition war on Yemen. According to Oxfam, in October 2016, the imported food covered only 40% of the demands and “[c]ountless homes, warehouses, farms and vital parts of civilian infrastructure have been destroyed. Food prices are continuing to rise, while many of the poorest people have lost their incomes. Now an estimated 17 million Yemenis, 60 percent of the population, are suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition, including 7 million now on the brink of famine. This is a 60 percent increase since 2014.”[34]
24. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states that over 14 million people lack sufficient access to health care and are food insecure, seven million of whom are severely food insecure and do not know where there next meal will come from. This number represents a thirty-three percent (33%) increase from pre-war levels in late 2014.[35] OCHA expects that food insecurity will further deteriorate in 2017 “due to conflict-induced scarcity of basic commodities, the liquidity crisis, disruption of imports, the high price of essential commodities and dwindling livelihoods and income opportunities.”[36] According to O’brien, as it stands, “the situation for children is especially grave. 2.2 million babies, boys and girls are acutely malnourished and almost half a million children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. This represents a sixty-three percent (63%) increase since late 2015. Children are going to bed hungry every night.”[37]
25. According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, the crisis brought on by the conflict “has led to uncertainty about future food imports. In a worst-case scenario where food imports drop substantially for a sustained period of time or where conflict persistently prevents the flow of food to local markets, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is possible in 2017.”[38]
26. According to UNICEF about 63,000 children under the age of five died from preventable diseases related to malnutrition[39], and an additional 460,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition.[40]
27. Most recently on 18 December 2016, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Jamie McGoldrick, addressed the Yemeni press stating that “at least one child dies every 10 minutes from preventable diseases in Yemen.”[41] In other terms, 144 children die every day in Yemen from preventable diseases.
28. In the immediate term, mobile cranes must be provided to the Yemeni ports in order to help speed up offloading of cargo and the actors that block humanitarian and commercial cargo from entering Hodeida Port must be brought to account. An independent international investigation is in order in Yemen to investigate violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
Legal Analysis
29. According to the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, all states have an obligation to adopt a national strategy to reduce poverty. It follows that a national strategy to impoverish millions of civilians stands in violation of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty as well as International Human Rights Law. The Hadi government-in-exile decision to move the CBY to Aden has resulted in the disruption of the CBY’s implementation of fiscal and monetary policy and the withholding of oil and gas revenue and taxes along with 1.5 million public sector employee salaries in a deliberate attempt to directly impoverish 7.5 million civilians.
30. The Coalition airstrikes on the infrastructure of the food sector coupled with the blockade on food and fuel imports violates Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food.” The systematic targeting of the food sector with airstrikes (see Paragraph 3) and the ongoing comprehensive blockade that has lasted for more than two years (see Paragraph 5) is a deliberate attempt to starve an entire nation of people into subjugation or until death which is a violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” Using starvation as a method of warfare also violates Article 54 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) which states that “[i]t is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.” When asked by Nawal Almaghafi in an interview on BBC why cranes that could be providing life saving aid, food and fuel for the Yemeni people have been sent back, the Saudi Coalition spokesperson, Brigadier General Ahmed Assiri stated: “because we don’t want to continue to enhance the capabilities of the Houthis to generate money and smuggle weapons.” This is not an acceptable justification for the starvation of millions of civilians rather the Coalition’s spokesperson answer in fact implicates and incriminates the Saudi Coalition for its deliberate attempt to starve over 14 million people.
31. The blockade has induced famine in certain parts of Yemen and has caused an estimated 63000 babies to die from preventable diseases related to malnutrition in 2016 alone. The Coalition’s deliberate act to starve civilians is in violation of the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition of 1974 which states that “[e]very man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition.”
32. Article 31 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that “[t]he World Conference on Human Rights calls upon States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to trade relations among States and impedes the full realization of the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights instruments, in particular the rights of everyone to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being, including food and medical care.” It is our understanding that the Special Rapporteurs will consider as unilateral coercive measures any measures other than those taken by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, which include but are not limited to “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” To qualify the interpretation of Article 41, it is also our understanding that Member States have to comply with U.N. Security Council decisions without adding to or retrenching from their content, pursuant to articles 25, 48(2) and 103 of the Charter. While U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 may have been intended as a “smart” coercive measure designed to place an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five specifically named individuals, the actual use transformed U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 into a “comprehensive” coercive measure that violates the human rights of millions of Yemenis, particularly their right to food, medicine and to be free from poverty.
33. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2140 and 2216 involve an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five named individuals. They are not U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning war on Yemen, nor do they make permissible the imposition of a comprehensive land, air, and sea blockade that blocks regular trade, both import and export, in commercial goods, including food, medical, fuel supplies, and humanitarian aid. Despite the limitations of these resolutions, the Saudi Coalition unilaterally launched a war by land, air and sea citing the resolutions to justify a blockade on millions of Yemenis that has exponentially exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation in Yemen.
34. The comprehensive land, air and sea blockade amounts to a collective reprisal, which is in violation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention IV. Article 33 states that when it comes to the protection of civilians in times of war, “no protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation…are prohibited.” In the past two years, the Saudi Coalition’s imposition of a comprehensive land, air and sea blockade on Yemen has blocked the entry of essential foodstuffs violating Article 23 of the Geneva Conventions (IV), in addition to contravening the principles of proportionality, distinction and military necessity.
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Citations
[1] Mohammed Aboud, Egypt allegedly sends ground forces into Yemen quagmire, The Middle East Eye, 9 August 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egyptians-allegedly-sends-ground-forces-yemen-quagmire-132459953#sthash.qu9yz0EN.dpuf
[2] Mohammad Mukashaf, Pakistan declines Saudi call for armed support in Yemen fight, Reuters, 10 April 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0N10LO20150410
[3] Blog, Turkish and Saudi leaders discuss Yemen conflict, The Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/live-blog-saudi-and-arab-allies-bomb-houthi-positions-yemen-1521000548
[4] Sudan to send 10,000 troops to join Arab forces in Yemen: report, The Sudan Tribune, 19 October 2015. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56779
[5] Ishaan Tharoor, Why Senegal is sending troops to help Saudi Arabia in Yemen, The Washington Post, 5 May 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/05/why-senegal-is-sending-troops-to-help-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/
[6] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/798202287269232640
[7] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/798255050002792448
[8] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/798212362738298881
[9] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/798204847837368321; https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/798207790804303872
[10] Legal Center for Rights and Development
[11] Ibid; https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/828672534790955009
[12] http://arwarights.org/unilateral-coercive-measures-complaint
[13] http://arwarights.org/blockade-on-healthcare-supplies; http://arwarights.org/airstrikes-blockade-on-ports
[14] https://www.vimye.org/home
[15] ARWA’s discussions with the Port Authority in Hodeida.
[16] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/827964661333123072; https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/827932883822247936
[17] Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, 31 October 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-10 [accessed 26 December 2016]
[18] Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, 26 January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-11 [accessed 30 January 2017]
[19] Ibid
[20] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]
[21] Yemen’s Economic Outlook- April 2017, World Bank, April 2017, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/777611492266548883/Yemen-MEM2017-ENG.pdf
[22] ARWA’s Executive Director discussions with Central Bank of Yemen sources and reports.
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid
[25] Ibid
[26] Presidential Decree No. 119 (2016)
[27] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]
[28] Ibid
[29] ARWA has been receiving complaints by student leaders from various countries across the World.
[30] A table showing the development of commodity imports for the years 2010-2015 as compared to 2009. Central Statistical Organization of Yemen. 2016 values are a conservative estimate based on discussions with and reports of the relevant authorities.
[31] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]
[32] Ibid
[33] Oxfam Yemen Situation Report #33, 15 December 2016 ‐ Bi‐weekly, 15 December 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/oxfam-yemen-situation-report-33-15-december-2016-bi-weekly [accessed 31 December 2016]
[34] https://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/crisis-yemen [accessed 17 April 2017]
[35] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]
[36] Yemen: Humanitarian Dashboard (January - December 2016), OCHA, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/humanitarian_dashboard_jan_to_dec_-_25122017_v2.pdf [accessed 30 January 2017]
[37] Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, 26 January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-11 [accessed 30 January 2017]
[38] Food Assistance Outlook Brief, Famine Early Warning Systems Network, January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Final%20Jan%202017%20FAOB_0.pdf [accessed 30 January 2017]
[39] https://twitter.com/UNICEFmedia/status/829676324889489409
[40] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]
[41] https://twitter.com/OCHAYemen/status/810476064099233793?lang=en