The Saudi-led Coalition blockade and airstrikes on Yemen coupled with the Hadi Government Decision To Withhold Public Sector Employee Salaries Amount to Unlawful Unilateral Economic Coercive Measures That Have Impoverished Millions In Yemen, Including Vulnerable Elderly Populations, and Has Brought An Entire Nation to the Brink Of a Man-Made Famine By Using Starvation As a ‘Weapon of War’

Background on Conflict

1.    On 26 March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia consisting of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar (withdrew in June 2017), Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco (withdrew in Feb 2019), (together “the Coalition”) launched a war on the Yemeni people without a U.N. mandate to “defend the legitimate government of President Hadi from the takeover attempts by the Houthi militias in Yemen.”[2]  From the outset, the Coalition was supported politically, diplomatically, and militarily by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey.

2.  The Coalition war on Yemen came at a time when all Yemeni political parties and factions were negotiating the way forward during the transitional period. The war had the effect of derailing the Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue that was taking place and along with it the political solution that was to come about from it as explained on 27 April 2015 by the former U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, who stated unequivocally that “when this campaign [the Coalition military campaign] started, one thing that was significant but went unnoticed is that the Yemenis were close to a deal that would institute power-sharing with all sides, including the Houthis.”[3]

3.  After about two months of war without achieving its stated official objectives and after failing to convince Egypt[4], Pakistan[5] and Turkey[6] to provide ground troops, the Coalition sought out other ways to bolster its troops on the ground in preparation for a ground invasion. To achieve that end, the Coalition hired foreign troops and mercenaries.[7]  After months of stalemate, the number of countries participating in the Coalition increased to include Sudan[8] and Senegal[9], both sending large numbers of troops to Yemen. In addition to hiring Sudanese and Senegalese troops, the Coalition relied and continues to rely on the use of mercenaries to continue hostilities.

4.  In the first 4 years of war, the Coalition conducted daily airstrikes that killed and injured a reported 60,000 civilians[10] and leveled civilian infrastructure, particularly targeting the health, education and food sectors along with their distribution networks.  According to the Legal Center for Rights and Development, 15 airports and 14 seaports were targeted with airstrikes, alongside 341 health facilities including 5 maternity centers, 897 schools (another 3750 were shut down compromising the right to education as 1.8 million children stopped attending),[11] 790 water tanks and networks, 193 power stations (affecting refrigeration and water pumping facilities), 637 markets, 347 factories, 3838 agricultural fields, 336 poultry/livestock farms, 759 food warehouses, 631 food trucks, and 2661 roads and bridges, among other civilian objects.[12]

5.  The Coalition used internationally banned cluster munitions to target residential areas and agricultural fields among other civilian objects on at least 106 occasions as reported by the Yemeni Monitoring and Documentation Center.[13] [14] According to the Legal Center for Rights and Development, at least 221 children casualties were documented to be due to cluster munitions.[15] Despite the danger to children posed by these cluster munitions, the Coalition continues to use these internationally banned weapons on civilian areas with impunity.

6.   In addition to daily airstrikes, the Coalition imposed an unlawful comprehensive land, air and sea blockade on Yemen, under the pretext of implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216, which involves an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five named individuals.[16] The Coalition stopped ships at will, and over the course of the first three years of war delayed their entry for days, weeks or months at a time under the pretext of ongoing weapons searches, granting these ships entry at times only after a coerced bribe.  Ships were even denied entry entirely despite searches that did not result in findings of weapons.[17]

7.   In May 2016, former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced the U.N. Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM).[18]  The UNVIM is designed to facilitate the unimpeded flow of commercial goods and services to three Yemeni ports - Saleef, Mokha, Hodeidah and associated oil terminals - while ensuring compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the U.N. Security Council.  In effect, the UNVIM addresses the Coalition’s blockade by establishing a U.N. mechanism for searching and inspecting incoming ships for weapons, in order to make the process more efficient and thereby help alleviate the mass suffering caused by the blockade.  However, ships carrying commercial goods and humanitarian aid continued to be blocked from entry into Yemen’s ports even with the UNVIM in place.  For example, in the month of March 2017 alone, 16 ships with containers of mixed food items were diverted to Saudi ports, such as Jizan port, despite being cleared by the UNVIM.[19]

8.   According to the Yemeni Petroleum Company, as of 5 April 2019, 127,033 tons of fuel was held up in Djibouti by the Saudi Coalition despite being licensed by the UNVIM.  This delay along with the daily docking charges in the tens of thousands of dollars for each day the fuel tanker is present at Djibouti results in an economic loss amounting to about a) USD 4.8 million in one month and the complete halting of operations at b) 1730 fuel stations, c) 6460 medical facilities, d) over 1000 factories, e) the entire transportation sector and f) 90% of the agricultural sector.

9.   The blockade on food, medical and fuel supplies coupled with the airstrikes on health facilities and cadre, power plants, water and food networks has caused mass suffering among the civilian population, particularly the most vulnerable: children, women, elderly persons, and the injured.

a.   The blockade on food has led to a situation where “17.8 million people in Yemen are food insecure. Out of this, approximately 8.4 million people are severely food insecure and at risk of starvation - a worrying increase of 24 percent. The conflict has destroyed people’s livelihoods and reduced their purchasing power, making it difficult for many Yemenis to meet minimal food needs.”[20]  Children, pregnant women and people with chronic health conditions are at greater risk of death as they face the “triple threat” of conflict, famine and cholera. About 2.9 million require acute malnutrition treatment, including 1.8 million children and 1.1 million pregnant, lactating women.[21]

b.   According to the Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “the blocking of essential medicine and vaccines and the lack of fuel arriving in Al Hudaydah port will impact millions of people that are already suffering from a lack of health services and multiple preventable diseases. All health facilities are reliant on fuel for delivering essential life-saving services and Diphtheria is spreading fast with 120 clinically diagnosed cases and 14 deaths in the last week. At least one million children are at risk of contracting the disease.”[22] OCHA goes on to state in its report that “[t]he inability to re-supply life-saving maternal medicines and supplies will threaten the lives of 400,000 pregnant women and their newborns, including 53,000 pregnant women who are likely to develop complications during childbirth.[23]

c.   A child is dying every ten minutes[24] amounting to over 63,000 children deaths in 2016 alone due to preventable causes according to UNICEF.[25] And according to Save the Children another 50,000 children death were estimated in 2017.[26]  In late November 2018, Save the Children revised the estimate upwards to 85,000 children deaths[27] while the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights in Sanaa announced back in March 2018 that 247,000 died due to preventable causes which could not be treated because of the blockade.[28]

d.    In the first year of the Coalition imposed travel ban on flights to and from Sana’a International Airport, more than 27,000 civilians died because they could not get medical treatment abroad according to Yemen’s Ministry of Public Health and Population and another 200,000 are awaiting the same fate.[29]

10.   In his update to the U.N. Security Council on 31 October 2016, the Undersecretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O’brien stated that offloading cargo can take up to 30 days because of 1) inefficient port management, 2) financial disputes among shippers and above all 3) slow offloading due to limited capacity at Hodeidah port which was severely damaged by airstrikes in August 2015.[30] As a consequence, fuel imports have averaged a fifth of the pre-airstrikes levels since February 2016.[31]  In his update to the U.N. Security Council on 26 January 2017, O’brien stated that “delays in receiving clearances are also due to restrictions imposed by the Saudi-led Coalition such as the hampering of vessels’ access to Yemeni Red Sea ports and the absence of clear lists of prohibited items.”[32]  Providing an example of the Coalition’s interference with incoming cargo ships, O’brien stated that “a vessel carrying four WFP-procured mobile cranes has arrived in the Red Sea, but has been ordered by Saudi authorities to leave Yemeni waters and was directed to anchor 15 miles off Yemen’s coast and prevented from entering the port until recently on 15 January 2018.[33]

11.    According to the 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “[t]he World Bank estimates that the poverty rate in Yemen has doubled to 62 per cent, and millions of people are now unable to meet their basic needs independently. Deliberate polices and tactics are driving this decline. On numerous occasions, parties to the conflict have targeted key economic infrastructure such as ports, roads, bridges, factories and markets with air strikes, shelling or other attacks. They have also imposed severe access restrictions that severely disrupt the flow of private sector goods essential to civilians’ survival, including food, fuel and medicine. Millions of people are now unable to meet their needs independently as a result of the economic decline – itself the result of deliberate policies. Imposed restrictions on imports, movements and financial transactions are crippling the commercial sector and hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid. The end result is an economic environment in which basic commodities are becoming scarcer and more expensive, putting them increasingly out of people’s reach.”[34]  The 2017 Humanitarian Overview goes on to state that “[r]eported restrictions on imports by the Coalition, as well as air strikes on critical infrastructure like Al Hudaydah [Hodeidah] Port, have added to the humanitarian burden by severely reducing commercial imports into the country. Fluctuating Coalition restrictions on imports, as well as air strikes on critical infrastructure like Al Hudaydah [Hodeidah] Port, have added to the humanitarian burden by severely reducing commercial imports into the country. More than 90 per cent of staple food in Yemen was imported before the crisis, and the country was using an estimated 544,000 metric tons of fuel per month.”[35]

12.   The Coalition war has had a devastating impact on what was an already fragile economy in Yemen.    According to the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, the “Yemeni economy has contracted sharply since the conflict erupted and Yemen is facing an extraordinary fiscal challenge in 2017. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined 41.8 per cent between 2015 and 2017– equivalent to a loss of US$32.5 billion, or USD 1,180 per capita. Since January 2017 the Yemeni Rial has lost 28 per cent of its value, further undermining the Yemeni economy which heavily relies on imports paid for in US dollars.”[36]  According to the World Bank, although official statistical reporting on Yemen is no longer available, “the data gathered suggests that Yemen’s GDP contracted since 2015 by about 40%, cumulatively.”[37]

13.   According to the Global Humanitarian Overview of 2019, “[t]he situation in Yemen has significantly worsened and is deteriorating rapidly. In 2019, some 24 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection, making Yemen once again the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.”[38]  Current estimates show that one third of all districts in the country are already pre-famine and at least 12 million Yemenis may require food assistance in the months ahead.”[39]  “The Yemeni economy is on the verge of collapse. Cumulative losses in real GDP are estimated at 47.1 per cent over the past three years. More than 600,000 jobs have been lost. Between June and September [2019], only one letter of credit for importers of food and fuel was issued”[40] as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Saudi Ministry of Finance, in collusion with the Hadi government, exercise discriminatory practices by rejecting applications of merchants from the Northern parts of Yemen who are seeking to import food and medicine, a policy that enables the use of starvation as a weapon and ensures the economic deprivation of millions of people in Yemen.

14.   “Shortages of foreign exchange, artificial increases in money supply, lack of liquidity, restrictions on imports and remittances, long delays at ports and irregular customs and taxes are driving the country to the brink of famine. The cost of a food basket has increased by 60 per cent in the past 12 months and fuel prices have doubled in the past 2. Hundreds of thousands of families are being forced out of local markets, unable to purchase the basic necessities required to survive.”[41]

 15.   Public sector revenue was negatively impacted by the war during the years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and continues to be the case in 2019.  Crude oil and liquefied natural gas exports were suspended by the Hadi government-in-de-facto-exile (Hadi government) causing revenues from oil and gas exports to drop by 80% and 65%, respectively, in 2015. In 2016, there was no oil and gas revenue to be accounted for since the Hadi government decided to resume exports and deposit the proceeds in a Saudi Commercial bank rather than in the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) account in violation of the CBY’s rules and regulations.  The loss of revenue from oil and gas exports has, in turn, created considerable fiscal challenges as revenue from taxes has been proportionally slashed as well, not to mention the loss of an essential source of foreign exchange which has jeopardized the entire Yemeni banking sector.[42]

16.   From March 2015 to September 2016, government agencies across the country deposited their revenues into government accounts held in the CBY headquarters in Sanaa and the CBY branches located in their respective governorates. However, starting September 2016, the branches of the CBY in Aden, Mukalla, and Almahra stopped depositing the revenues collected in their jurisdiction in CBY government accounts. Instead, the Hadi government established separate current accounts into which large sums of collected revenues were set aside and used in violation of Yemen’s laws and the CBY’s rules and regulations. Alongside this, Marib’s branch, did not record with the CBY network any oil and gas revenues gained from sales in the domestic market since late 2015.[43]

17.   Notwithstanding the downward pressures in government revenue explained above, the CBY, under the leadership of Bin Humam, provided the necessary liquidity for the salaries of all public agencies and pension payments amounting to about YR 90 billion up to the end of August 2016.  This included salaries of military personnel which were paid in cash from CBY branches to regional commands across governorates regardless of the recipient’s affiliation with either side of the armed conflict. Critical health, water, and education expenditures were also made in the period when the CBY was under the governance of Bin Humam.[44]

18.   As a remedial measure to the liquidity crisis, the CBY under the governance of Bin Humam negotiated terms with the Russian Goznak Company to print Yemen’s currency whereby the first batch was to arrive in Yemen as early as September 2016.  However, the Hadi government interfered with the agreement’s execution and managed to ensure that the Russian company did not sign off on the agreement.[45]

19.   On September 18, 2016, Transitional President Hadi sacked the Central Bank Governor, Mohammed Bin Humam and unilaterally announced the relocation of the CBY from Sanaa to Aden.[46]

Statement of Facts and Allegations

20.  The CBY move directly interfered with the CBY’s implementation of Yemen’s fiscal and monetary policy and thereby its ability to fulfill its mandate causing millions of civilians to suffer as a result. According to the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, the “public budget deficit expanded significantly since the last quarter of 2016, leading to a discontinuation of the provision of operating costs for basic social service facilities. There have been major irregularities and disruptions in payment of public sector salaries since August 2016.”[47]

21.  The CBY move to Aden under the control of the Hadi government has resulted in the non-payment of monthly salaries to about 1.5 million public sector employees since September 2016, despite assurances by the Hadi government to the international community that it would undertake all the obligations of the CBY.  Given that each public sector employee has an average of five dependents, the lack of payment of their monthly salaries for over twenty months directly impoverishes about 7.5 million people.  The reduced purchasing power due to the lack of salary payments has had an indirect negative effect on economic activity in general further impoverishing merchants and traders, their employees and families.  After a comprehensive examination of violations and crimes occurring in Yemen, the Group of Eminent Experts confirmed in their report issued on 28 August 2018 that “the problem has been exacerbated by the Government’s non-payment of public sector salaries, affecting one quarter of the population, since August 2016. The effects of the price increases coupled with the erosion of their purchasing power have been disastrous for the population.”[48]

22.   Customs and tax revenues collected in southern and eastern governorates surpass their salary expenditures yet the surplus is not being transferred to branches in the North and West of Yemen where 85 percent of the population is located.  In addition to newly printed bank notes in possession and control of the Hadi government not being transferred to CBY branches under the control of de facto authorities, surplus tax revenue from the southern and eastern governorates is not being transferred to the Northern and Western governorates either.

23.   Whereas, the CBY under Bin Humam was facilitating the underwriting of transactions on behalf of merchants importing basic commodities such as wheat, rice and oil, this is no longer happening effectively under the CBY governance of the Hadi government.

24.   The drop in Yemen’s foreign exchange reserves due in large part to the blocking of oil and gas exports coupled with the blockade on food, medicine and fuel imports has resulted in the skyrocketing of commodity prices by more than double pre-war price levels widening the poverty base in the country. As stated in the 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “[c]onflict, severe economic decline and imposed restrictions are all contributing to basic commodity shortages and price rises, making it difficult for millions of Yemenis to afford food, water, fuel and other necessities even when these are available in markets.”[49]  According to the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, “poverty amongst the population has continued to rise significantly.”[50]

25.   While withholding payment of salaries to public sector employees for about 3 years impoverished millions of civilians, the lack of payment of scholarships for students studying abroad has caused hundreds to stop their pursuit of higher education because they could not cover tuition nor their accommodation expenses including rent and general living expenses.[51]

26.  The liquidity crisis brought on by unlawful unilateral coercive measures coupled with the withholding of newly printed money by the Hadi government has severely affected elderly persons who had pensions that were not paid for two years.  Before the CBY move to Aden, all 123,807 pensioners nationwide in Yemen were receiving an entitled pension on a monthly basis equal to approximately YR 5.4 billion.  After the CBY move to Aden under the control of the Hadi government, payments stopped to more than 41,000 pensioners, all of whom were located in Northern governorates.  Pensioners are entitled to their benefits in cash based on their service for 35 years.  The pension fund has a positive balance of approximately YR 800 billion that could cover pension entitlements for several years into the future yet the liquidity crisis and the decision of the Hadi government to selectively pay the pensions of the people located in southern governorates to the detriment of all pensioners in the northern governorates, save those in Taiz and Marib, has left over 41,000 elderly people without their sole source of income, more than a third of whom have chronic illnesses and are dependent on treatment with increasingly expensive medicine they have to purchase.  The pension fund has a 5% shareholding[52] in Yemen Liquefied Natural Gas Company that yielded a monthly average of YR1.8 billion in 2014 but since the launching of the war, the Coalition has prevented it from exporting and no proceeds have been made available to pay pensioners.[53]  As of the November 2018, an agreement was reached to pay pensioners their entitlements of which payments were made on a monthly basis to this date.

27.   Humanitarian aid is not only blocked from entry but targeted with different schemes. There are efforts by the Central Bank branch in Aden to convince international non-governmental organizations to deposit their humanitarian aid budgets at the Aden branch instead of private banks which would inevitably lead to politicizing the aid.

28.   The Saudi Coalition backed Hadi government continues to: 1) engage in monetary policies that fan the flames of inflation, 2) discriminatorily reject issuing letters of credit to merchants living in the northern parts of Yemen and 3) attempt to render invalid the licenses of merchants in the northern parts of Yemen who are engaged in the foreign exchange market by demanding that only those who are licensed by the Aden branch of the CBY be allowed to conduct foreign exchange transactions which would inevitably affect millions of civilians heavily dependent on foreign remittances for basic daily needs.

Stockholm Agreement

29.   We welcome the efforts made by the international community and the UN Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths, which culminated in a landmark agreement in Stockholm (Stockholm Agreement[54]) and the subsequent adoption of UN Security Council resolution 2451 and 2452 codifying the terms of the agreement.  But we express dismay that not only was the flight ban on Sanaa International Airport not lifted, one of the most pressing issues facing civilians was not discussed, namely the economic measures imposed on the civilian population which is being used to impoverish and starve millions of Yemenis as a weapon of war.

30.   The Stockholm Agreement that took place in December 2018 was a three part agreement involving 1) the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa, 2) an executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange agreement, 3) a statement of understanding on Taiz to establish a committee.

31.   Prisoner Exchange:

a.   While we welcome the agreement to exchange over 15000 prisoners held by the parties to the conflict, we express grave concern regarding the list provided by the Saudi-led Coalition backed government which included over 100 people who are deemed to be members of Alqaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).   While it is reported that AQAP is fighting alongside the Coalition in the battle against what they call Houthis which in reality are Yemenis of all walks of life, some of the AQAP prisoners the Saudi Coalition backed government seek to be released were convicted and imprisoned before the war and others during the war, a number of whom have admitted to committing extrajudicial executions of Yemenis. We are sounding the alarm bells once more and question the cover of legitimacy and recognition given to an expired, exiled government that appoints members of AQAP to its cabinet, hires them as negotiators, utilizes other such designated people as clerics and who now seek their release when they have been imprisoned for materially supporting what is arguably deemed the single most dangerous terrorist group in the World today.

b.    The delegation of the de facto authorities in Sanaa submitted a list of over 7000 prisoners of which the Coalition only recognized custody over about 700 despite the ICRC having visited some and note their existence and the families having direct contact with the prisoners. On a brighter note, we welcome the unconditional release on 29 January 2019 of Musa Awaji, the Saudi prisoner of war who was suffering from an ailment that could not be treated in Yemen due to the blockade on medicine and medical supplies.  We also commend the reciprocity shown by the Saudi Coalition in releasing 7 prisoners belonging to the forces of the de facto authorities.  We hope that good faith measures such as these translate to the building of the requisite confidence to arrive at a political solution, and ultimately an end to the war.

32.   The de-escalation in Taiz has not taken place nor has a committee been established with any results worth noting here.[55]

33.   Hodeidah Ceasefire:

a.   As for the Hodeidah ceasefire brokered in Stockholm, we condemn in the strongest terms the ongoing ceasefire violations which have never ceased after the agreement was made, the repeated targeting and destruction of wheat silos in the Al Hali District of Hodeidah, and the recent targeting and the killing of a member of the landmine removal personnel attempting to create safe passage to the silos.  We also condemn the targeting of UN personnel working to monitor the ceasefire agreement.

b.  After a five month delay in implementation due to differing interpretations of the terms of the Hodeidah ceasefire, particularly the phrase “[s]ecurity of the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa shall be the responsibility of local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law”[56] a unilateral redeployment took place.  The Chair of the UN support mission that is overseeing the Hodeidah Agreement, Lieutenant General Michael Lollesgaard, confirmed on 14 May 2019 that “the redeployment of forces from Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa ports went ahead as agreed, albeit with some exceptions: security of the ports was handed over to the coast guard, but, he said, a lot of work needs to be done to remove military hardware.”[57]

c.   Despite the Hodeidah Agreement stipulating that a mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hodeidah would take place, we have not seen any reciprocation from the Saudi-led Coalition backed government as there has been no redeployment of Coalition fighters to this date, nor a stoppage of shelling on civilian areas in and around the city of Hodeidah.

d.   With the progress made on the unilateral redeployment of military forces belonging to the de facto authority, the deputy Head of Mission of the U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen, Muin Shreim, met the warring parties in the Jordanian capital of Amman on 14 May 2019, to begin discussing the implementation of the economic provisions of the Hodeidah Agreement which stipulated that  the 1) parties shall facilitate the freedom of movement of civilians and goods and humanitarian aid from and to the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa and 2) revenues of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa shall be channeled to the Central Bank of Yemen through its branch in Hodeidah as a contribution to the payment of salaries in the governorate of Hodeidah and throughout Yemen.[58]

e.   According to ARWA’s Executive Director, Ahmed Alshami, who partook in those to discussions with a team of financial, monetary and economic policymakers and professionals, the Saudi Coalition backed Hadi government participated with three people and an observer whose main objective was to thwart the talks and which ended with an announcement by their delegation that the talks had failed.

f.    The goal of the meetings was to provide solutions to the problems facing the economy of Yemen by neutralizing the economy as a whole to limit the effects of the war on the free flow of goods into Yemen and to alleviate the economic deprivation of millions of Yemeni civilians through the payment of public sector salaries.  Central to the solution is the unification and independence of the Central Bank of Yemen so that it functions to serve all Yemenis without discrimination according to its procedures and bylaws and the Yemeni Constitution.  However, since a comprehensive solution was left for later discussions, one solution offered focused on setting up a separate account in the Hodeidah branch, under supervision of the U.N. and both warring parties, that would collect by deposit customs revenues from the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa which would be used to make payments of public sector salaries nationwide with any deficits to be covered by revenues generated from oil exports that have been unaccounted for in Marib, Shabwa and Hadhramawt and customs revenues from ports under Saudi Coalition control.  However, the Coalition backed Hadi government was more concerned with taking control of the Central Bank branch in Hodeidah and connecting it with Aden’s branch even though they do not exercise full control over Aden’s branch or other branches particularly those located in Marib and Mukalla where different militias financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE control the branches and operate separately outside a unified Hadi government command, a command that does not effectively exist.

34.   Protecting the Yemeni economy is an objective that all parties should strive for given that its decline and potential collapse will affect civilians in all governorates, who must be spared the horrors of war.  The payment of public sector salaries and continued payment of pensions to all is of critical importance to alleviating the humanitarian suffering faced by millions and will help jump start the economy. More importantly, the monetary policies that benefit the entire population must be in place so as to limit effects of inflationary pressures.  To do so, the Central Bank of Yemen must be administered by a board of capable directors established by consensus and revenues from oil exports must be deposited in a CBY account for distribution.  As a first step, this requires the presence of representatives from all sides without which no agreement can be had as witnessed with the consultations in Stockholm and more recently in Amman where the delegates from the Saudi Coalition backed internationally recognized Hadi government responsible for the economic file did not discuss and attempt in good faith to resolve the outstanding economic issues.  Instead, an agreement was made for a prisoner swap, a ceasefire in Hodeidah and a de-escalation in Taiz, none of which have been implemented in full.  However, we understand that the Stockholm Agreement was made to happen because of pressure from the international community borne out of an understanding that there can be no military victory in a battle that will only further worsen a situation that is being called the worst humanitarian crisis in the World today.  It is this type of sustained pressure we urge the United Nations and members states to exert on the parties to the war in order for them to come to an agreement that avoids an entire collapse of the economy and alleviates the suffering faced by millions of civilians.  In addition, we urge the member states of the United Nations to maintain the pressure on the parties to fully implement the Stockholm Agreement and U.N. Security Council resolution 2451 and 2542 and express our full support for the efforts of the U.N. Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in that regard.

Legal Analysis

35.   According to the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, all states have an obligation to adopt a national strategy to reduce poverty.  It follows that a national strategy to impoverish millions of civilians stands in violation of the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty as well as International Human Rights Law.  The Hadi government decision to move the CBY to Aden has resulted in the disruption of the CBY’s implementation of fiscal and monetary policy and the withholding of oil and gas revenue and taxes along with 1.5 million public sector employee salaries in a deliberate attempt to directly impoverish 7.5 million civilians and amounts to using the economy and starvations as a weapon of war.

36.   Older persons with entitled pensions are particularly vulnerable because the pension is often times the only income an older person has to cover basic needs and the needs of their dependents. According to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons, older persons should be able to live in dignity and security and be free of exploitation and physical or mental abuse, yet the withholding of pensions for over 2 years by the Hadi government only exploits their vulnerabilities and worsens their physical and mental state in the hopes of achieving certain political and military objectives.

37.   The Coalition airstrikes on the infrastructure of the health, education and food sectors coupled with the blockade on food and fuel imports violates Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food.”  The systematic targeting of the food sector with airstrikes and the ongoing comprehensive blockade that has lasted for more than two years is a deliberate attempt to starve an entire nation of people into subjugation or until death which is a violation of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”  Using starvation as a method of warfare also violates Article 54 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) which states that “[i]t is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.”

38.  The blockade has induced famine in certain parts of Yemen and has caused an estimated 247,000 children to die from preventable diseases related to malnutrition that could have been treated but for the blockade on food, medicine and fuel.  The Coalition’s deliberate act to starve civilians is in violation of the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition of 1974 which states that “[e]very man, woman, and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition.”  The blockade also prevents liquefied natural gas from being exported, the proceeds of which would be used to pay pension entitlements belonging to over 41,000 older persons.

39.  Article 31 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action states that “[t]he World Conference on Human Rights calls upon States to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to trade relations among States and impedes the full realization of the human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights instruments, in particular the rights of everyone to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being, including food and medical care.”  It is our understanding that the Special Rapporteurs will consider as unilateral coercive measures any measures other than those taken by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, which include but are not limited to “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” To qualify the interpretation of Article 41, it is also our understanding that Member States have to comply with U.N. Security Council decisions without adding to or retrenching from their content, pursuant to articles 25, 48(2) and 103 of the Charter. While U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 may have been intended as a “smart” coercive measure designed to place an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five specifically named individuals, the actual use transformed U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 into a “comprehensive” coercive measure that violates the human rights of millions of Yemenis, particularly their right to food, medicine and to be free from poverty.

40.  U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2140 and 2216 involve an arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban on five named individuals. They are not U.N. Security Council resolutions sanctioning war on Yemen, nor do they make permissible the imposition of a comprehensive land, air, and sea blockade that blocks regular trade, both import and export, in commercial goods, including food, medical, fuel supplies, and humanitarian aid.  Despite the limitations of these resolutions, the Saudi Coalition unilaterally launched a war by land, air and sea citing the resolutions to justify a blockade on millions of Yemenis that has exponentially exacerbated the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen.

41.   According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures, Mr. Idriss Jazairy, the blockade “involves a variety of regulatory, mostly arbitrary, restrictions enforced by the coalition forces – including an unreasonable delay and/or denial of entry to vessels in Yemeni ports” that “amounts to an unlawful unilateral coercive measure (UCM) under international law” and that “involves grave breaches of the most basic norms of human rights law, as well as of the law of armed conflict, which cannot be left unanswered.”[59]  The Special Rapporteur’s stance has been endorsed by the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, Alfred de Zayas and the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Hilal Elver who stated that “the deliberate starvation of civilians in both international and internal armed conflict may constitute a war crime, and could also constitute a crime against humanity in the event of deliberate denial of food and also the deprivation of food sources or supplies.”[60]  As reported by the U.N. Panel of Experts in January 2018, the Coalition measures have the “effect of using starvation as an instrument of war.”[61]  Reiterating this position in different terms, the Group of Eminent Experts stated in their August 2018 report that there is “[n]o possible military advantage could justify such sustained and extreme suffering of millions of people. The coalition has failed to cancel or suspend the restrictions, as required under international law.”[62]

42.  The comprehensive land, air and sea blockade amounts to a collective reprisal, which is in violation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention IV.  Article 33 states that when it comes to the protection of civilians in times of war, “no protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation…are prohibited.”  In the past two years, the Coalition’s imposition of a comprehensive land, air and sea blockade on Yemen has blocked the entry of essential foodstuffs violating Article 23 of the Geneva Conventions (IV), in addition to contravening the principles of proportionality, distinction and precaution.

_____________________________________

Citations

[1] All statements of allegations are based on field work and discussions with local and international NGOs, the various UN organs, the Yemeni General Authority for Social Security and Pensions, the Yemeni Ministry of Public Health and Population, the Yemeni Supreme Board for Drugs and Medical Appliances, the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation and the Executive Director of ARWA.  Media reports are only cited to show that the statements made herein have been reported by media outlets from various countries across the world.

[2] Official news conference statement by then Saudi Ambassador to the United States Adel Aljubeir, 25 March 2015, http://arwarights.org/infinite

[3] United Nations Press Conference, Jamal Benomar, 27 April 2015, http://webtv.un.org/watch/jamal-benomar-special-adviser-to-the-secretary-general-on-yemen-security-council-media-stakeout-27-april-2015/4199486038001

[4] Mohammed Aboud, Egypt allegedly sends ground forces into Yemen quagmire, The Middle East Eye, 9 August 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egyptians-allegedly-sends-ground-forces-yemen-quagmire-132459953#sthash.qu9yz0EN.dpuf

[5] Mohammad Mukashaf, Pakistan declines Saudi call for armed support in Yemen fight, Reuters, 10 April 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN0N10LO20150410

[6] Blog, Turkish and Saudi leaders discuss Yemen conflict, The Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/live-blog-saudi-and-arab-allies-bomb-houthi-positions-yemen-1521000548

[7] Use of Mercenaries by the Saudi-led Coalition to Violate Human Rights in Yemen and Impede the Exercise of the Yemeni People’s Right to Self-determination, http://arwarights.org/foreign-mercenaries-file

[8] Sudan to send 10,000 troops to join Arab forces in Yemen: report, The Sudan Tribune, 19 October 2015. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article56779

[9] Ishaan Tharoor, Why Senegal is sending troops to help Saudi Arabia in Yemen, The Washington Post, 5 May 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/05/why-senegal-is-sending-troops-to-help-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/

[10] 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_hno_2018_20171204_0.pdf,  [accessed 12 April 2018]

[11] Complaint to the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Education, Arabian Rights Watch Association, 19 February 2017, http://arwarights.org/education-violations

[12] https://twitter.com/LCRDye/status/1109734041312464897

[13] Report for the Month of February 2018. The Yemeni Center for Monitoring and Documentation

[14] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/828672534790955009

[15] https://twitter.com/LCRDye/status/1027947044575567873

[16] http://arwarights.org/unilateral-coercive-measures-complaint

[17] http://arwarights.org/blockade-on-healthcare-supplies; http://arwarights.org/airstrikes-blockade-on-ports

[18] https://www.vimye.org/home

[19] ARWA’s discussions with the Port Authority in Hodeidah.

[20] 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_hno_2018_20171204_0.pdf,  [accessed 12 April 2018]

[21] Key Messages on Cholera, United Nations, 23 July 2017 https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Yemen/Yemen%20Key%20Messages%20on%20cholera_23July2017.pdf

[22] Yemen: Impact of the closure of seaports and airports on the humanitarian situation - Situation Update 2, Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 16 November 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-impact-closure-seaports-and-airports-humanitarian-situation-situation-update-2-16

[23] Ibid

[24] https://twitter.com/OCHAYemen/status/810476064099233793?lang=en

[25] https://twitter.com/UNICEFmedia/status/829676324889489409

[26] YEMEN: Hunger & disease could kill at least 50,000 children this year, more if the aid blockade continues, 15 November 2017, https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/yemen--hunger---disease-could-kill-at-least-50-000-children-this

[27] Yemen: 85,000 Children May Have Died from Starvation Since Start of War, Save the Children, 20 November 2018, https://www.savethechildren.org/us/about-us/media-and-news/2018-press-releases/yemen-85000-children-may-have-died-from-starvation

[28] The Humanitarian Catastrophe in Yemen: 2015 – 2018.  Official Report of the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights.

[29] Minister of Health calls on the Secretary-General of the United Nations to work to stop the aggression and lift the blockade, Saba, 12 September 2018 http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news504138.htm

[30] https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/827964661333123072; https://twitter.com/arwa_rights/status/827932883822247936

[31] Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, 31 October 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-10 [accessed 26 December 2016]

[32] Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, 26 January 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator-11 [accessed 30 January 2017]

[33] World Food Programme Delivers 4 Cranes to Hodeidah Port http://yrspc.net/index.php/item/1619-lastnews

[34] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 17 April 2017]

[35] Ibid

[36] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 12 April 2018]

[37] Yemen’s Economic Outlook- April 2017, World Bank, April 2017, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/777611492266548883/Yemen-MEM2017-ENG.pdf

[38] 2019 Global Humanitarian Overview, https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO2019.pdf [accessed 27 May 2019]

[39] Ibid

[40] Ibid

[41] Ibid

[42] ARWA’s Executive Director discussions with Central Bank of Yemen sources and reports.

[43] Ibid

[44] Ibid

[45] Ibid

[46] Presidential Decree No. 119 (2016)

[47] 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_hno_2018_20171204_0.pdf,  [accessed 12 April 2018]

[48] https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/YE/A_HRC_39_43_EN.docx

[49] 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview, http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-2017-humanitarian-needs-overview, [accessed 12 April 2018]

[50] 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_hno_2018_20171204_0.pdf,  [accessed 12 April 2018]

[51] ARWA has been receiving complaints by student leaders from various countries across the World.

[52] http://www.yemenlng.com/ws/en/go.aspx?c=ylng_share

[53] All claims made herein are based on discussions with the head of the General Authority for Social Security and Pensions and in person interviews of pensioners.

[54] Stockholm Agreement, 18 December 2018, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/stockholm_agreement_-.pdf

[55] A statement of understanding on Taiz, 18 December 2018, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/taiz_agreement.pdf

[56] Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa, 18 December 2018, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/hodeidah_agreement_0.pdf

[57] UN monitoring team in Yemen verifies pullout of armed forces from crucial port zones, UN News, 14 May 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1038461

[58] Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa, 18 December 2018, https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/hodeidah_agreement_0.pdf

[59] Lift blockade of Yemen to stop “catastrophe” of millions facing starvation, says UN expert, OHCHR, 12 April 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21496&LangID=E

[60] Yemen: amid food crisis, UN expert warns of deliberate starvation of civilians, UN News Centre, 11 August 2015. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51605#.VwvavPkrLIV

[61] Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Panel of Experts, 26 January 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/letter-dated-26-january-2018-panel-experts-yemen-mandated-security-council-resolution

[62] Group of Eminent Experts Report, 28 August 2018, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/39/43